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Seeing Silence: Filmic and Acoustic Convergences in the Work of Thierry 
Knauff and Francisco López. 
 
Even in an age in which representation is supposedly dead, the dominant moulds into 
which artistic forms are cast predominantly remain transcendent, which is to say that 
they contain an internal coherence that simultaneously justifies their existence as 
autonomous entities in the world and divorces them from the world. In such artistic 
expressions, the transcendent goal is most often one of representation—providing a 
pseudo-reflection of an external and infinite realm within an enclosed and internal 
work—, illustration—explicating external phenomena according to the internal 
axiomatics of an art form—, or narration—recounting a self-sufficient narrative that 
contains an order not present in the chaotic outside. The ways to go beyond such 
transcendent models in the Twentieth Century are numerous: we have only to think of 
Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake, Francis Bacon’s aesthetic of sensation, Antonin Artaud’s 
theatre of cruelty, Marcel Duchamp’s decontextualisations or Damien Hirst’s acts of 
provocation to understand how such non-representational aesthetics differ in their affect 
from more conventional and normalized modes of aesthetic transmission. Even in much 
late twentieth-century philosophy and Theory that uses such works as examples to 
explicate its own thought, the very démarche of philosophers such as Deleuze and 
Derrida practices the very non-containment and anti-reductionism that they find in other 
works, be it in Derrida’s semantic slippages or Deleuze’s fleeting amorphous concepts 
which are traversed by lines of flight.  
 For Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, the escape from representational 
forms, or forms premised upon an originary identity, often takes place through 
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processes of difference and repetition. Repetition, he writes, ‘is by nature transgression 
or exception, always revealing a singularity opposed to the generalities which give rise 
to laws’ (Deleuze 1994: 5). Similarly, difference, that principle which governs intensive 
movements—which is to say movements that are not transcendent but created only 
through a dynamic interaction—is likewise removed from representation. Deleuze 
states:  
 
Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. 
Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and 
in consequence a false depth. It mediates everything, but mobilises and moves 
nothing. Movement, for its part, implies a plurality of centres, a superposition 
of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of movements which 
essentially distort representation. (Deleuze 1994: 55-56) 
 
Precisely how these processes of difference and repetition might work in practice can be 
seen in Deleuze’s analysis of the work of Raymond Roussel. Deleuze finds in Roussel’s 
work verbal series whose precursors are provided by nouns, homonyms or quasi-
homonyms—such as the pairing of billard – pillard. In between these various series, 
Roussel inserts ‘strange stories […] in such a manner as to induce an effect of 
resemblance and external identity’. By doing this, for Deleuze, the nouns and 
homonyms used as precursors do not refer to an originary identity but rather deploy a 
differential relation across their series that causes the series to resonate together 
(Deleuze 1994: 121).  
 In Deleuze’s analysis of Roussel, it is in part due to a level of self-reflective 
awareness of the very matter of which all written art forms are composed that intensive 
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(as opposed to extensive and representational) movements are deployed in the work 
since it is the divergence between two plosives that provides the key to interpretation. 
Indeed, the material self-reflexivity of Roussel’s work is made all the more manifest in 
Deleuze’s analysis thanks to the latter’s reliance on the differential relation between two 
plosives (b – p), the plosive being (in auditory phonetics) perhaps the most deeply 
textured of phonemes, forming a strong element at the beginning of words and requiring 
a more tactile physiological process for its formation than other sounds. To sum up, 
then, the disruption of representation in Roussel’s work is played out firstly through the 
estranging of narrative (his ‘strange stories’), secondly through the movement between 
series effectuated by difference and repetition, and thirdly through a use of signifier as 
objet sonore, a textural element with its own singular ontology.  
 These very same movements can be observed in the work of Spanish composer 
Francisco López and in the Belgian film maker, Thierry Knauff’s 2000 production, Wild 
Blue: notes à quelques voix and it will be the task of this paper to trace these 
movements in their works, thereby producing analyses which may seem to be somewhat 
at odds with their manifest modus operandi. When one takes into consideration that fact 
that López obtained a PhD in entomology and that he is employed by the ecology 
department of the University of Madrid, it might be thought that he is interested in using 
sound as a means to document reality—documentation being, it hardly needs saying, the 
form in which the resemblance between original and copy should be most rigidly 
enforced—but this is not at all the case, even when he takes as his sound source the 
rainforest or other nature environments (as he does on many of his recordings). Indeed, 
in the liner notes to one such recording, La Selva, López is at great pains to stress his 
radical departure from bioacoustics which he sees as ‘a common reductive interpretation 
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of nature recordings. This discipline’, he goes on to explain, ‘focuses on capturing the 
sounds produced by different animal species, mainly for identification purposes’ (López 
1998)—thereby linking sonic signifier to signified in a rigid hierarchy of identity. For 
López, this documentary use of sound relegates the very importance of that sound as 
sound matter, for it concentrates on the referent which, as a biological entity, is divorced 
from its sonic matter once enunciation has taken place. Rather, López is interested in 
‘the transcendental dimension of the sound matter by itself’, which is to say that he is 
interested not in the sound’s relation to an outside that it would represent but rather to 
sound’s own inner world, its status as an objet sonore (López 1998).  
 Far from re-establishing a link between sound and source, then, López’s work is, 
rather, as Philip Sherburne has written in his review of Untitled #104, ‘a radical 
decontextualisation, stripping the sound of any association with its original production, 
and resituating in a field of pure sonic material’ (Sherburne 2000: 51). Through this 
absolute decontextualisation, López performs an estrangement of narrative, 
referentiality and illustration, for the work no longer stands as either an ordered or 
disordered reflection of an external reality, and it is only through his manipulation of 
sonic material that López rips his work from these transcendent realms. More than this, 
however, López’s conception of the entire artefact produced partakes in this divorce 
from an external reality, for whilst his earlier works such as La Selva bear a descriptive 
title or image which ties the work to its context, in recent times López has increasingly 
favoured a minimalist approach to presentation and packaging, his works being released 
in clear cases with no text other than their (a)moniker, Untitled #χ. As he explains in an 
interview with Fear Drop magazine,  
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putting titles or images attached to the sound work has far-reaching 
consequences in terms of restricting [its] possibilities and confining the sound 
creation into specific intentions or meanings. […T]here’s a whole lot of 
misinterpretation in seeing my austere recording’s presentations (empty 
transparent cases, no titles, etc.) as a design issue. It has nothing to do with 
minimal design, but it’s rather a way to leave the sound content open and to 
emphasize the essential importance of pure, blind listening. (López 2000) 
 
 Like Roussel, then, López divorces his works from all external narratival, 
illustrational, representational and conceptual impositions which might render 
transcendent (in their relation to an originary identity) apprehension of his artefacts 
possible instead to force our attention in onto the very sonic matter that he is treating. 
Similarly, his treatment of that sonic matter uses repetition as a founding principle, even 
though he refutes this. Asked by an interviewer from Revue et Corrigée how his use of 
repetition and cloning of sound cells links up to the displacement of the Bejaminian 
notion of aura that this induces in an era of mass-duplication, López replies:  
 
The repetition and slow modification of cell musical units was the historical 
path followed by most American minimalist composers (and their European 
counterparts), with a very peculiar and, in my opinion, poor way to parallel the 
achievements of their minimalist partners in sculpture or painting. I don’t work 
with such a structural conception and don’t consider my music to be repetitive 
at all. As I perceive them, both the sound environments that I create and those 
that I listen to with fascination (generated by others or by the world) are not 
repetitive; they have a solid, flowing, permanent presence. (López 1999) 
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López’s protestations at his work being analysed according to laws of repetition, 
however, no longer hold once we move away from the Platonic conception of repetition, 
in which ‘the model is supposed to enjoy an originary superior identity […] whereas the 
copy is judged in terms of a derived internal resemblance’ (Deleuze 1994: 126-127), 
and towards a Leibnizian or Deleuzean notion of repetition. To explain how this kind of 
repetition operates, Deleuze firstly asks us to consider an instance of what we might call 
banal (Platonic) repetition as produced by the repetition of a decorative motif in which 
‘a figure is reproduced, while the concept remains absolutely identical’ (Deleuze 1994: 
19). He continues, ‘This is not how artists proceed in reality. They do not juxtapose 
instances of the figure, but rather each time combine an element of one instance with 
another element of a following instance. They introduce a disequilibrium into the 
dynamic process of construction, an instability, dissymmetry or gap or some kind which 
disappears only in the overall effect’ (Deleuze 1994, 19). Repetition of this order, 
therefore, instigates difference in itself, which is to say that it produces an intensive  
energy. It is precisely according to such principles that López’s exploration of sound 
matter proceeds, for the repetition of seemingly identical sound cells creates difference 
in itself or an intensive energy that is the very solid, flowing, permanent presence that 
López sees in his own work.  
This difference in López’s work makes itself manifest in a number of ways. On 
Untitled #90, for instance, the investigation through repetition of the environmental 
sound matter of the rainforest morphs almost imperceptibly into a consideration of the 
sea before moving back again to insects of many different varieties, to the rainforest as a 
whole, to rain, to a different rainforest and so on. In this way, the listener is forced to 
find in this apparent repetition of an originary identity a process of differentiation in 
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which each repeated cell is a discrete singularity in itself that does not refer back to an 
originary identity but is rather a simulacra. On Untitled #104, meanwhile, López, 
starting from absolute silence, gradually presents us with sections of the individual cell 
of sound matter to be explored—a blast of death metal guitars and drums. Stuttering 
into life, following no apparent rhythmic logic, #104 eventually settles into what 
appears to be a pattern of banal repetition. Indeed, if one examines wav graphs of these 
cells at various points throughout the composition, there appears to be little difference 
between them (see figure 1).  
[insert figure 1 about here. Caption:] (Figure 1: Wav graph of 9.08 seconds of Francisco 
López’s Untitled #104 split into two 4.54 second portions.) 
Listening to the piece, however, the impression one gets is most definitely not one of 
banal repetition. It changes, shifts, moves, displaces, all the while affirming its own 
primordial and complete ontology as a singularity, as absolute sound or sonic matter. As 
Philip Sherburne writes in The Wire, ‘Rather than growing louder, or faster, or harder, it 
expands within, like a sponge, absorbing every sound it touches, turning space into a 
solid’ (Sherburne 2000: 51). 
As a last example of this process, let me briefly recount my own experience 
listening to López’s vinyl-only release on the Mego label, Untitled #92. Having placed 
the disc of virginal-white acetate on my turntable, and knowing only that all of the sonic 
material on this album was produced from the sounds of the interaction between a stylus 
and a vinyl run-out groove (a choice which imbues the piece with a high-level of self-
reflexivity and an even greater textural potential due to the symbiosis of data and 
reader), I settled back in my armchair, eyes shut, and listened—López’s preferred mode 
of reception from his public. After about forty-five minutes, bemused at how López had 
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managed to cram so much material onto one side of a 33rpm 12” record, I wandered 
over to my turntable to discover that my stylus had only advanced about one centimetre 
and was bouncing back and forth in the first locked groove of the album. What I had not 
realized is that three-quarters of this release is made up entirely of locked grooves. Why 
I had not realized this for forty-five minutes is because the repeated locked groove to 
which I had been listening deployed not a passive repetition, but an active one that 
created difference in itself with the quite extraordinary effect that I had truly believed 
myself to be listening to one, continuous, evolving piece stretched out in a linear groove 
over the entire recording surface. López had succeeded, in other words, in employing 
repetition as an agent of difference, and through that process had turned signifier (for 
noise as extraneous information in the transfer of data, as is the case with vinyl hiss, can 
indeed be a signifier) into an objet sonore, a textural element with its own singular—
which is to say capable of an infinite number of transformations—ontology. 
Thierry Knauff, like Francisco López, has spent time in rainforests, Knauff 
visiting South Cameroon to shoot his 1995 film Baka which portrays the lives and 
struggles for survival of the Baka Pygmies as the hardwood trees amongst which they 
live are decimated for commercial gain. Baka, like other films of Knauff’s such as 
Anton Webern (1991) and Seuls (1989), is essentially a documentary, in spite of 
Knauff’s tendency to problematise and transgress the limits of that form, a trait 
remarked upon in Agence.court: Bulletin trimestriel d’informations sur les activités du 
court métrage (2). Baka, indeed, essentially conforms to the model of conventional 
documentary or ethnographic cinema outlined by D.N. Rodowick in his book Gilles 
Deleuze’s Time Machine (see 1997: 157).  
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 The documentary form by its very nature forges an organic link between a 
supposed originary identity or reality and its representation, just as does the bioacoustic 
tradition that López is so eager to distance himself from, as we have seen. As much as 
Knauff’s Wild Blue: notes à quelques voix, his first feature-length film, might appear in 
sections essentially to conform to this conception of documentary cinema, this film, like 
López’s pseudo-bioacoustics, subverts the documentary form to create something much 
more powerful by concentrating on the singular ontology of his object and medium and 
deploying difference and repetition to estrange narrative, create series in movement and 
investigate the textures in and with which he works. 
 That Wild Blue superficially resembles a documentary is perhaps not surprising 
given the fact that it is partly assembled from fragments of other works far more firmly 
rooted within that genre shot during Knauff’s peregrinations around the world. The 
fragmentary, collage form that is born of this methodology is evident from the very 
beginning of Wild Blue. The film starts from black, the soundtrack revealing insects and 
birds and the sound of wood being chopped. When the black screen finally gives way to 
image, the scene is precisely as would be expected, showing the everyday scenes of an 
African village and a lone figure chopping wood shot from within a house. A young girl 
enters the frame to stand at the door through which this scene is shot and to contemplate 
this scene with us. We cut to a close-up shot of her hand resting on the doorway’s rough 
stone surface and linger on this shot. We then cut to a close-up of her face as she 
glances to the side and then into camera. We cut to black and the opening credits. The 
distant rumbling heard as the opening credits roll morphs into the sound of a plane 
which reveals, once more, exactly what is expected with the return of the image: a shot 
of a plane in the sky, except that, rather than presenting the clarity of 35mm stock, the 
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image is now highly pixelated, as though shot on a low-grade camcorder. The sound of 
the plane continues, mixed with the sound of rustling leaves as we cut to a (non-
pixelated) close-up of trees. As the camera pans slowly down from the treetop to its 
base, we hear humming and the sound of children playing, children that we see once we 
reach the base of the tree. 
In these opening minutes of the film, what quickly becomes apparent is that we 
are not in the documentary realm, in spite of any initial red herrings: far from being 
witness to the gradual accretion of a coherent, objectively observed portrait of a specific 
reality, we are, rather, offered fragments, each of which will become interlinked 
throughout the film only insofar as they each constitute a series or motif that enters into 
harmony and resonance with other series. This is to say, then, that the link from frame 
to frame is not narratival, does not follow the representational model outlined by 
Deleuze in Difference and Repetition, nor the sensorimotor logic of classical cinema 
that he outlines in the first volume of his work on cinema, The Movement-Image, and 
which is summarized by D.N. Rodowick in the following manner:  
 
The sensorimotor schema limits movement to a physical trajectory or 
transformation in space, giving a restricted sense to the image and to the 
narrative logic deriving from it. Affections must be translated into spatial 
images constitutive of a mise-en-scène. These in turn create the possibility of 
situations requiring series of actions and reactions, conflicts and resolutions. 
The whole of the sensorimotor schema unfolds as organic composition where 
commensurability is the rule: on the one hand, movement between the parts of 
the whole; on the other, montage within which the web of actions and reactions 
is woven. Each requires connection through rational intervals. In every case the 
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image has precise spatial and temporal coordinates, which map predictably its 
extensions into other images. The motivation and the vehicle of change is a 
certain motricity. (Rodowick 1997: 74) 
 
In cinematic texts obeying a sensorimotor schema, then, the justification for every 
element of the mise-en-scène obeys a pragmatic imperative driven by concerns exterior 
to the text itself, alien to the specificities of the cinema, concerns which are known in 
advance and that deny the image the very possibility of real movement (Deleuze 1986: 
7). Rather than present a cinema of this kind—which essentially differs from the 
documentary form only insofar as its content is deemed fictional—, Knauff, in these 
opening sections of Wild Blue, presents us rather with what Deleuze has termed 
heautonomous opsigns and sonsigns, pure optical and auditory images that stand in 
isolation from each other and enter into relation via movement across series. Knauff, 
like López, achieves this isolation of the image from a normalized conception of linear 
narrative and time through processes of difference and repetition. Whilst he often 
repeats a shot, for instance, lingering successively on a building, or a tree, or a drill, his 
use of different angles, close-ups, slow zooms and pans, rather than forming a banal 
pattern of repetition in which the concept remains identical—premised on an originary 
identity or reality as are all representations—creates the disequilibrium in the dynamic 
process of construction that Deleuze talks of (Deleuze 1994: 19). The movement 
emanating from this process, as has been seen, creates a plurality of centres that distorts 
representation (Deleuze 1994: 56) in much the same way that the movement-image (in 
Deleuze’s analysis of pre-World War II cinema) creates an indirect image of time by 
freeing perception from a fixed point of view, juxtaposing divergent and conflicting 
movements. More than this, however, by creating this movement in the very mechanics 
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of the shot as the camera lingers on essentially static subjects, Knauff further distances 
us from normalized representational and temporal schemata grounded in Newtonian 
physics’ universal laws of motion, providing us with an image of time in its pure state, 
time as a model for thought conceived of along Bergsonian lines as internal movement. 
Knauff presents us, then, with a time-image—insofar as this is an achievable 
objective—and he does so, firstly, through the use in cinema of the painterly or 
photographic conceit of still life. As Deleuze writes on this phenomenon:  
 
There is becoming, change, passage. But the form of what changes does not 
itself change, does not pass on. This is time, time itself, ‘a little time in its pure 
state’: a direct time-image, which gives what changes the unchanging form in 
which the change is produced. [...] The still life is time, for everything that 
changes is in time, but time does not itself change, it could itself change only in 
another time, indefinitely. (Deleuze 1989: 17) 
 
 Turning our gaze inwards towards the singular, discreet images themselves and 
away from the external relation to an originary identity that representational forms 
impose upon us, the movement that takes place across the film as a whole is effectuated 
via series, via a movement effectuated between ‘any-moment-whatevers’ and which, 
then, necessarily produce ‘the new, that is […] the remarkable and the singular’ 
(Deleuze 1986: 7). This new, or affect, arises in the in-between of series, the interval, 
and relates movement to a quality that passes into the subject (or centre of 
indetermination) not as an object of perception nor an act of the subject but as 
coincidence of subject and object as pure quality. Because it is precisely in the in-
between that the new arises, the interstice, the gap between series, becomes of the 
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utmost importance in the time-image. As Deleuze writes of Godard, a director in whose 
work this gap plays a major role:  
 
in Godard’s method, it is not a question of association. Given one image, 
another image has to be chosen which will induce an interstice between the two. 
This is not an operation of association, but of differentiation, as mathematicians 
say, or of disappearance, as physicists say: given one potential, another one has 
to be chosen, not any whatever, but in such a way that a difference of potential 
is established between the two, which will be productive of a third or of 
something new. […T]he interstice is primary in relation to association, or 
irreducible difference allows resemblances to be graded. The fissure has 
become primary, and as such grows larger. It is not a matter of following a 
chain of images, even across voids, but of getting out of the chain or the 
association. Film ceases to be ‘images in a chain … an uninterrupted chain of 
images each one the slave of the next’, and whose slave we are (Ici et ailleurs). 
It is the method of BETWEEN, ‘between two images’, which does away with 
all cinema of the One. It is the method of AND, ‘this and then that’, which does 
away with all the cinema of Being = is. Between two actions, between two 
affections, between two perceptions, between two visual images, between two 
sound images, between the sound and the visual: make the indiscernible, that is 
the frontier, visible. (Deleuze 1989: 179-180) 
 
Knauff, for his part, explicitly recognizes the importance of the interstice in the 
creation of the musical—which is to say built from motifs, refrains and variations—
construction of his film. Indeed, one of  the female voices that narrates his film, 
espousing a philosophy remarkably similar to that of López, says:  
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Without silence, there is no design, there is no figure, it’s just a line. We begin 
from silence, therefore the pause is essential, the silence is essential. Otherwise 
it’s a flat line if you don’t use the pause and music is like structure, it is cutting 
in time, if I may say so. 
 
This philosophy resonates strongly with two vital aspects of Knauff’s 
démarche in Wild Blue: his use of silence and, especially, of the black screen 
which is an extremely frequent trope throughout the film that functions precisely 
in the interstitial manner that Deleuze identifies in much (non-classical) 
contemporary cinema and especially that of Garrel. Indeed, Deleuze suggests 
that ‘“The absence of image”, the black screen or the white screen’ no longer 
merely functions as punctuation in much contemporary cinema, obeying only its 
pragmatic, visible function, but that it has a further legible, non-visible function, 
namely to instigate a relation between the image and its absence. No longer 
obeying merely a pragmatic function, this absence of image formed by a cut 
becomes irrational, ‘valid for itself’, and thereby takes on genetic powers 
(Deleuze 1989: 200).    
 As was the case with López, then, Knauff’s use of difference, repetition and the 
interstice allow movement between series as opposed to linear, narratival movement and 
strict correspondences. Similarly, this non-representational expression composed of 
opsigns and sonsigns converts the signifier from these two axes into the audiovisual 
equivalent of an objet sonore which is of interest primarily because of its textural or 
timbral qualities. The clue to this reading of the film lies firstly in the predominance of 
the sense of touch. 
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 As Deleuze has suggested, in cinema constructed of opsigns and sonsigns, the 
tactile is often the dominant sense. He writes, ‘it is the tactile which can constitute a 
pure sensory image, on condition that the hand relinquishes its prehensile and motor 
function to content itself with a pure touching’ (Deleuze 1989: 12). Outside of the 
sensorimotor schema, in which relations between images follow a purely functional 
imperative as they drive plot and characterization forwards towards an inexorable end, 
we are then invited merely to hold each image, to caress it, to contemplate it in itself 
and for itself. Indeed, this notion of the tactile forms the first and primary recurrent 
motif of the film—as can be seen from the image chosen for the film’s poster which 
shows a sun-cracked clay wall covered in white paint handprints. This sense of the 
tactile is transmitted firstly in images such as this, in slow, lingering shots of hands or 
feet in isolation or coming into contact with objects—feet on parched earth, hands 
handling letters, a hand opening and closing on itself, dancers coming into contact with 
the floor and each other in an intimate choreography, hands clapping and rhythmically 
rubbing together, a praying mantis cleaning itself meticulously, a boy’s cupped hands 
under a tap collecting water to rub on his face, a child caressing the soft prickles of a 
seed pod—but also through a manipulation of the very medium in which these images 
are presented.  
 The shot of a plane in the sky, as we have noted, is a highly pixelated image, an 
effect achieved by filming the image from a video image and repeating this process 
several times in order to force a generational degradation of the image. This process is 
seen elsewhere in the film and is often imposed on the second recurrence of an image. 
For instance, the tactile shot of feet walking over parched earth appears as a crystal-
clear image first, only to be repeated shortly after in a highly pixelated form. Whereas 
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this device would often serve as a means to cast a sense of reality on the image, imbuing 
it with a documentary aura, for Knauff, it is simply a matter of heightening the tactile 
quality of the image, of exploring more fully the texture of the image. When asked why 
he combines 35mm quality with video he replies:  
 
For one thing, because it is partly in video that snatches of the world 
are captured for us.  
But also, so that we are reminded by its texture that it is only an image. 
And that the closer we get, the less we see. (Knauff) 
 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in a section of the film where we are shown a series 
of ancient statues so weathered and time-worn that their faces are for the most part 
missing. Knauff chooses to present these images in pixelated form and to shoot them 
(or, rather, the video image of them) in an ever nearer succession of close-up shots. As 
we get closer, the number of pixels on the screen decreases with the obvious result that 
the clarity of the image recedes until we are left with a pure image, a textural surface 
which has lost its signifying capacity and which can only be apprehended in itself and in 
the gap created by the relation of the recorded image to its re-recorded manifestations 
(see Deleuze 1986: 85). 
Whilst Knauff’s use of video renders explicit the dominance of the textural 
qualities of the image over its documentary, representational, narratival or signifying 
aspects, his attention to the interplay of light and its effects upon his chosen film stock 
and developmental process—which provides clarity in the image whilst retaining grainy 
textures—are of paramount importance throughout the film. When prompted to 
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comment on his attention to materials in the organic sense of the term in his 
photographic treatment, he states:  
 
The light may linger on the grain of someone’s skin, or on the veins of a leaf. It 
may be blinding, or it may accentuate the curve of a shoulder. It emanates from 
the material, and makes it visible. (Knauff) 
 
 The soundtrack also participates in this reflection on texture. As Knauff notes, 
‘[the sound] never simply reiterates what we see. It has its own input. Like the image, it 
is an active participant in the film. The sound is the flesh of the film. It is a conveyer of 
meaning, and, most importantly, of feeling’ (Knauff). Precisely how the soundtrack 
performs this function through its use of non-voiced sound is easy to hear, for the 
sounds accompanying the images augment them, rather than simply being an adjunct to 
them. Thus, as we watch the leaves of a tree rustling in the wind, we can also discern 
the sound of rainfall, even though the image shows no rain. As is the case in López’s 
#90 discussed earlier, however, all that matters in the interplay of these different sounds 
is that their proximity of timbral qualities brings difference in itself to life through 
repetition, allowing a sensorial shift to take place almost imperceptibly. The isolation of 
the soundtrack, rather than serving merely to accompany the image, augments the tactile 
qualities of the image—as in the shots of the maîtres tambourineurs de Burundi and 
female dancers whose movements are heard as much as they are seen—and also asserts 
its symbiosis with and autonomy from the image through its continuous movement 
across the visual series of the film. Visually constructed, as we have noted, of discrete 
images, often isolated from each other by a black screen and that do not follow a linear 
narrative but enter into resonance with each other in a totally non-linear and apunctual 
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fashion, the soundtrack, rather than follow the cuts and breaks of the visual montage, 
often continues from one frame to the next, even across a black screen. In this manner, 
the soundtrack, whilst augmenting the tactility of the images, also asserts its autonomy 
from them, and it is this dual interplay between the auditory and the visual that rips even 
its voice-over narratives from a representational or documentary sphere.  
 The voice-over narratives of the film recount stories of extreme violence and 
suffering: knee-capping in Northern Ireland; civil disturbance and massacres in 
Burundi; the history of anti-aircraft towers in Germany; the calculated precision and 
deceit used to dispatch letter bombs; a reflection on the atrocities of which even 
educators and medical practitioners are capable of in times of war; the story of the water 
of a fountain being dyed red with blood to render the symbolism of power even clearer; 
a description of a man who delights in play-acting with firearms and other symbols of 
death; a lament for the lack of silence in the modern world of speed and the lack of 
compassion of a sniper; a song of sorrow; tales of personal tragedy and, finally, the 
harrowing story of a nine-year old schoolgirl raped (for it is immoral to kill virgins) and 
then killed for protesting against her country’s rulers in her notebook. It would be 
tempting to see in these accounts a documentary catalogue of the evil of which man is 
capable. The interplay of the dialogue and image, however, renders such a simplistic 
function impossible, for the images—deploying difference in itself through repetition—
disrupt the linear narratives of the voice-over. Whilst the images that accompany these 
(sometimes plurivocal) monologues do refer to them in an often direct manner, in 
moving according to intensive principles they do not, however, establish a 
commensurability between image and vocal narrative with the result that the latter is 
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subjected to the operations of the former and apprehended as an objet sonore. Let us 
examine an example from the film better to understand this. 
The monologue explaining the mechanics of knee-capping is accompanied by a 
set of reiterated images of barbed wired embedded in fragments of concrete, power 
drills and a hammer blow. Rather than serve merely as a visual parallel to or 
representation of the actions recounted, then, these images function as opsigns which in 
themselves reveal an undeniable beauty (just as the objects of violence portrayed, when 
abstracted from their function, can be contemplated as things to be beheld), and in 
breaking the signifying link between the auditory and the visual, it subsequently 
becomes very hard to concentrate merely on the narrative unfolding in our ears. Rather, 
we drift in and out of the story as we question its relation to the images, yet always 
remain aware of the timbral qualities of the voice which becomes, then, a sonsign, a 
pure acoustic image.  
Knauff has acknowledged that it was in large part due to the timbral qualities of 
these (exclusively) women’s voices that he selected them to narrate his film. When 
asked how he chose his speakers, he replies:  
 
Some women were directly affected by the issues touched on in the 
text. Others were selected for their voice quality: the way their timbre 
of voice complements or contrasts with other voices in the film. 
(Knauff) 
 
It is thanks to the timbral resonances between the voices of the film also that Knauff is 
able to achieve an organic totality in the film as a whole from within its plurivocality 
and multilingualism (elements which are sometimes deployed within a single 
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monologue), each voice constituting a repeated figure that creates disequilibrium and 
hence differential relations. 
 In suggesting that these stories serve primarily not to refer to a specific reality 
and that they are all figures of a repeated idea is not by any means, however, to rob 
them of their denunciatory power or political engagement. On the contrary, by rendering 
the very horror and violence denounced beautiful in itself, an unbearable tension 
between extremes is created (a tension which exists also, of course, between many of 
the film’s own series, such as violence and trees, adults and children, noise and silence) 
and an intensive movement instigated that produces a model of thought as that which 
cannot be thought. (We are here once more very close to Deleuze when he invokes 
Artaud and Blanchot (see Deleuze 1989: 167-168).) This is not a question of 
glamorising horror and violence (as is often the case in Hollywood product) but of 
forcing thought to be born from the impossibility of representing this violence—just as 
for Artaud thought is forced into life by ‘the inexistence of a whole which could be 
thought’ (Deleuze 1989: 168)—at the same time as this passage beyond narrative into a 
realm of affect (which might be described as a process of sublimation as we pass 
directly from a solid or human perception into a gaseous perception (see Deleuze 1986: 
84)) awakes in us a sensation of the sublime. 
 To relegate these stories to a mere documentary function so that they could enter 
into a process of banal repetition, always referring back to an originary reality and never 
able fully to recuperate the horror of that reality would, for Knauff, be unforgivable. As 
one of the film’s voices asks, invoking the media’s reporting of atrocities, ‘Who 
benefits from the endless repetition of such news?’. To take each of these stories simply 
as statistical evidence of the evil that resides in human nature would be to pretend to 
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explain and encapsulate that which escapes comprehension. As the voices in one of the 
film’s polyvocal and multilingual monologues remark:  
 
Jour après jour, soir après soir, s’empilent sans cesse les nouvelles de ces vies 
perdues [piling up endlessly]. Chaque corps est recouvert par un tas d’autres 
corps. Il y en a encore eu [so many], tant et tant. Chaque corps ainsi dénombré 
devient un chiffre qui s’ajoute au décompte de la veille. Chaque corps se perd 
dans un nombre qui le recouvre, chaque vie pourtant unique et différente est 
recouverte comme effacée par l’addition de tant de vies perdues. Empiler ces 
chiffres c’est oublier chacune de ces vies, c’est perdre une vie, plus une vie, 
plus une vie [plus one life, plus one life, plus one life].1 
 
[Day after day, night after night, news of these lost lives piles up endlessly 
[piling up endlessly]. Each body is covered by a pile of other bodies. There 
have been [so many] of them, so very many. Each body counted out like this 
becomes a number which is added to the total of the day before. Each body is 
lost in a number which covers it, each life, though unique and different, is 
covered as though forgotten by the addition of so many lost lives. To pile up 
these numbers is to forget each of these lives, it is to lose one life, plus one life, 
plus one life [plus one life, plus one life, plus one life]. 
 
 Knauff himself perhaps best sums up the serial logic and tension that drives his 
film when he himself reflects on it, musing:  
                                                 
1 The square brackets give the English translation, provided by the subtitles, of the dialogue of the second 
voice narrating this polyvocal monologue, a voice whose timbre is remarkably similar in spite of the 
difference of language used.  
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When I look at the film today, it seems to me that there is a permanent 
tension between a world that we know to be rife with extremes of intolerance 
and violence; and at the same time, the profound beauty of this world, despite 
the prevailing horror.  
I know this may seem a shocking thing to say, but this coexistence is 
one of life’s tensions. I don’t mean to imply that beauty is redeeming. I simply 
mean that it makes life more liveable. 
It helps us to live in this world in spite of everything… there is the 
horror and yet this beauty. 
This is not to suggest that we should dispense with revolt or compassion. 
(Knauff) 
 
Rejecting the simple binary of negative dialectics wherein contradictory elements 
deemed inadequate in themselves are resolved through the production of an underlying 
truth, the very conditions of possibility for living come, for Knauff, from the 
coexistence of contradictions held in tension—a superior dialectic—that affirms their 
difference and thus always produces thought out of irreconcilables that cannot be closed 
off in a tidy synthesis and that proffer no answer. It is not the aim of Wild Blue, then, to 
represent an exterior reality nor to provide solutions to the violence of the world, for it 
comes into being only in the in-between of violence and beauty (and the in-between of 
all of its other series) and can but assert those qualities. Its vision, then, is that of an 
innocent, that of a subject who has not yet been petrified by belief in an embodied self 
and who subjects all around it to its own perception. It is no doubt significant, then, that 
children form a part of this vision, for children (as Deleuze suggests in his paper ‘What 
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Children Say’ (Deleuze 1998: 61-67) and in his concept of becoming-child elaborated 
primarily in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: especially 232-309)) do 
not draw strict lines of equivalence and identification between objects but define the 
world around them through affects, drawing up a map of intensity as opposed to a map 
of co-ordinates. 
 This is not to say, however, that this vision is infantile or naïve, far from it; for 
its childlike qualities are merely one level of intensity of an infinite power to perceive 
differently through difference—just as a becoming-child is equivalent to a becoming-
animal or a becoming-imperceptible at a different level of intensity (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 299). As Knauff says, thinking about the motif of childhood that 
traverses Wild Blue:  
 
They are children. They represent nothing other than themselves. They 
don’t point to childhood or some notion of innocence. No. They are simply 
there. That’s all.  
Naturally they have a certain grace. And their presence moves me. But 
not exclusively. Or at any rate, not more than other individuals in the film.  
Nonetheless, these children are there, in the world; a world they didn’t 
choose, and that is as we know it to be.  
How is one to live in it, all things considered?  
It’s something I ask myself. Naturally I don’t know the answer. 
(Knauff) 
 
As for Francisco López, whilst he has not said so himself, it is entirely feasible 
that works such as his #90 can also be read not as documents recorded to archive the 
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dying cries of our environment—for such would be to admit defeat—, but as an 
embrace of those sounds that is born from the differential relation of the interaction of 
various intensities of the auditory content of our world, a relation whose immanent 
possibilities will be significantly reduced if man’s wholesale destruction of his own 
environment continues. Nonetheless, what is certain is that both of these artists in the 
final analysis discover in the estrangement of narrative, the deployment of difference 
arising from repetition and through an investigation of the very matter with which they 
work the means to break with the representational model long considered to be a 
limiting factor for artistic production. Rather than represent a known object or proffer 
the semblance of a documented reality, Knauff and López create, rather, a series of 
affects, images that reach us directly, outside of the sensorimotor schema and beyond 
linear time considered as a pre-constituted set, images that point towards a pre-personal 
politics in which the whole can be conceived of only as ‘the Open’, as a relation that 








                                                 
2 My thanks go out to Thierry Knauff for his film and his generosity to me during his visit to Australia 
and since, to Francisco López for the listening experiences he has given me, and to Culture, Theory and 
Critique’s peer reviewers.  
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